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Zero-interaction security (ZIS) allows pairing
or authenticating Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices without user involvement using sensor 
readings of their ambient environment. The 
rationale behind ZIS is that colocated devices, 
residing in the same physical space such as a 
room will observe similar events happening in 
their environment via on-board sensors (e.g., 
door opening, people speaking, etc.). Using 
similarity of their sensor readings, devices can 
either establish a shared secret key (pairing) or 
one device can prove its proximity to another 
device (authentication). The main advantages 
of ZIS are high usability as no human 
interaction is required, as well as scalability 
and deployability as most IoT devices are 
equipped with sensors. However, existing 
ZIS schemes were evaluated on different 
and sometimes unrealistic datasets (e.g., 
collected with few devices in a controlled 
environment), making them impossible  
to compare and calling their real-world 
utility and security into question.
In our study [1], we reproduced and 
compared five ZIS schemes, requiring us 
to collect seven different sensor modalities: 
audio, temperature, humidity, pressure, 
luminosity, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth beacons.  
To evaluate the security of the schemes 
under realistic conditions, we collected 
sensor data from three real-world scenarios  
(car, office and mobile) using a represen- 
tative number of heterogeneous sensing 
devices (up to 25) distributed to reflect 
potential IoT functionality (e.g., on a display, 
under the ceiling, etc.), running from several 
hours to multiple days, which is typical in 
the IoT. Our results showed that four out of 
the five schemes experienced significantly 
degraded security on our datasets [2].
Reproducing the work of others, 
collecting data and releasing it with the 
codebase were the main contributions of 
our study [1], which are often considered 
“not challenging” or “not novel” enough 
by reviewers, and hence, fall largely into 
the category of (almost) unpublishable 
results per se. In this article, we want to 
illustrate the difficulties we faced in our 
study by first describing the challenges 
encountered when reproducing five ZIS 
schemes such as the absence of the source 
code and documentation, ambiguities, 
and unspecified parameters. Second, we 
elaborate on challenges faced in the data 
collection starting from building a realistic 
setup to issues hindering reliable data 
collection such as power, connectivity, 
and fault tolerance. Third, we describe our 
experience in processing collected data such 
as ensuring its quality (e.g., identifying 
erroneous data) and working with large 
datasets. Finally, we outline best practices 
we followed for data release. 
REPRODUCING PUBLISHED
ALGORITHMS
Researchers commonly differentiate 
between reproducibility (being able to 
rerun the same code on the same data and 
obtain the same results) and replicability 
(being able to write a new implementation 
of the proposed algorithm from scratch, 
running it on the same data, and obtaining 
the same results) [3]. In our study, we 
found both to be impossible, as none of 
the papers had published their source code 
or data, which is common in computer 
science research [4]. After requesting access 
to code and data via e-mail, one team of 
authors provided us with their code (but 
no data), and another team provided us 
with their data. In the latter case, we were 
still unable to reproduce their results 
using the machine learning tool Weka that 
the authors had employed, likely due to 
different default parameters of machine 
learning algorithms in different versions of 
Weka, a problem anticipated by Benureau 
and Rougier [3]. The other authors did not 
respond to our requests or denied us access 
to the code and data due to intellectual 
property and privacy concerns.
Reproducibility and realistic datasets are crucial for advancing research. Unfortunately, they are often neglected as valid scientific contributions in many young disciplines, with computer science being no exception. In this article, we show the challenges encountered when reproducing the work of 
others, collecting realistic data in the wild, and ensuring that our own 
work is reproducible in turn. The presented findings are based on our 
study investigating the limits of zero-interaction security (ZIS) —a novel  
concept, leveraging sensor data collected by Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices to pair or authenticate devices. In particular, we share our 
experiences in reproducing five state-of-the-art ZIS schemes, collecting 
a comprehensive dataset of sensor data from the real world, evaluating 
these schemes on the collected data, and releasing the data, code, and 
documentation to facilitate reproducibility of our results.
In our discussion, we outline general considerations when conducting 
similar studies and give specific examples of technical and methodological 
issues that we experienced. We hope that our findings will raise awareness 
about the importance of reproducibility and realistic datasets in computer 
science and inform future research. 
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FIGURE 1. Sensing devices deployed:  
(a) Pi+Tag+Mic on a wall powered over PoE  
(b) Samsung S6 on top of a robot vacuum 
cleaner (c) RuuviTag on the upper arm.
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This left us with the task of re-imple-
menting all five schemes from scratch, 
based on the information given in the 
publication. This effort was hampered by 
ambiguous descriptions of parts of the 
algorithms, underspecified behavior for 
edge cases and, in some cases, missing 
values for system parameters (e.g., threshold 
values, sampling rates). We resolved these 
issues and validated our interpretations of 
the algorithms in communication with the 
original authors. However, due to the lack of 
original datasets, we were unable to replicate 
the results from the original papers.
To allow for a fair comparison between 
the five schemes, we decided to collect our 
own dataset, which will be described in the 
next section.
DATA COLLECTION,
PROCESSING AND RELEASE
In this section, we first describe our experi-
ences in building a reliable data collection
platform, highlighting major issues we faced 
when deploying it in realistic environments. 
We then elaborate on challenges when 
processing our large dataset and, finally, we 
summarize the main points to consider when  
releasing data and code. It goes without saying 
that for large data collection studies involving 
human subjects (e.g., audio data collection) 
an institutional review board (IRB) approval 
needs to be sought, which we recommend 
doing well in advance as the process may  
take several months in complex cases.
Data Collection
In our study, [1] we collected data from 
three scenarios: connected car, smart office, 
and mobile. In each scenario, we deployed 
multiple sensing devices to represent 
realistic IoT environments—each device 
was placed in a spot reflecting potential 
IoT functionality such as under the ceiling 
(e.g., smart light) or inside a trunk (e.g., 
smart sensor). Each scenario differs in 
terms of types of sensing devices used, their 
mobility and duration of data collection, 
posing different challenges. In the car 
scenario, we equipped two cars with six 
homogenous static devices each, collecting 
data during a four-hour trip. In the office 
scenario, we equipped three offices with 
eight homogenous static devices each, 
and collected data for one week. In the 
mobile scenario, we used heterogeneous 
sensing devices, both statically deployed 
and carried by users, and collected data for 
eight hours. Overall, we used four types 
of sensing devices: a Raspberry Pi 3 with 
attached TI SensorTag and a Samson Go 
USB microphone (Pi+Tag+Mic), a Samsung 
Galaxy S6 smartphone, a Samsung Gear S3 
smartwatch, and a RuuviTag. Figure 1 shows 
examples of sensing devices deployed in our 
scenarios. In the following, we elaborate on 
power, connectivity, fault tolerance and testing 
issues experienced during data collection,  
and solutions to these issues found.
Power
While smartphones, watches and RuuviTags 
have built-in batteries, customized sensing 
devices such as Pi+Tag+Mic, need an 
external power supply, accommodating the 
power consumption of both the attached 
peripherals and processes running on the 
main board. We empirically found that 
a power supply rated below 2.1A current 
(at 5V) leads to unpredictable behavior of 
Pi+Tag+Mic devices, hindering reliable 
data collection and emphasizing the need 
to carefully choose the power supply for 
customized sensing devices. 
In the office scenario, we used Pi+Tag+Mic  
devices, which were required to run one 
week non-stop, making the use of mains 
supply an obvious choice. However, we 
could not use AC power adapters due to 
their insufficient cable length as many 
devices were placed in spots (e.g., under the 
ceiling) without power sockets in proximity. 
Thus, we considered two other alternatives 
to deliver power over 5-10 meter distances: 
USB cables and Power over Ethernet (PoE) 
supplied via external adapters. While the 
former is much easier to deploy, we found 
that USB cables experience substantial 
voltage drops, resulting in insufficient power 
delivered to Pi+Tag+Mic devices, again 
hindering reliable data collection. PoE, on 
the other hand, did not suffer from voltage 
drops and additionally brought connectivity 
to the devices (see “Connectivity” section), 
making us favor this option.
In the car scenario, we also used 
Pi+Tag+Mic devices; however, the shorter 
duration of data collection, absence of 
mains supply and difficulties using bulky 
cables to deploy sensing devices inside a car 
motivated the use of portable power banks 
(10000 mAh). We used the same power 
banks in the mobile scenario to power a 
user-carried Raspberry Pi 3, capturing data 
from RuuviTags, showing that portable 
power supplies are suitable for several-hour 
data collections conducted with mobile 
devices, or when delivering power to static 
devices over wires is impractical.
 
Connectivity
In data collections, devices often need 
different types of connectivity (e.g., to a 
core network or between each other) for 
(a)
(b)
(c)
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purposes such as time synchronization, 
monitoring, and data delivery. In our 
scenarios, all sensing devices needed access 
to the Internet to perform the NTP update, 
facilitating the synchronous start of data 
collection and correct timestamping of 
sensor readings. We found that zone-specific 
NTP servers rate limit requests from the 
same network, so if the number of devices is 
above 20, we recommend either setting up 
a dedicated NTP server or spreading NTP 
requests over time.
Compared to a one-time NTP update, 
data delivery and data collection monitoring 
require permanent connectivity between 
the devices. In realistic environments, 
connectivity is affected by interferences 
caused by sensing devices themselves and 
neighboring devices communicating in the 
same frequency band. In our scenarios, 
we observed connectivity drops between 
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth devices communicating 
in the 2.4 GHz band, which we attribute 
to the overloaded spectrum. This caused 
occasional drops of the Bluetooth link 
between a SensorTag and Raspberry Pi, 
permanently terminating sensor data 
delivery from the SensorTag. We observed 
similar connectivity drops between sensing 
devices and a Wi-Fi access point (AP), 
hindering the use of Wi-Fi to remotely 
access devices for monitoring. These 
examples show that wireless connections 
should not be assumed reliable in realistic 
environments, and wires should be used 
instead if reliable connectivity is critical. 
Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance is indispensable to ensure 
reliable data collection. In realistic environ-
ments with distributed sensing devices, it 
is important to monitor liveness of data 
collection. The easiest way is to remotely 
access the devices, however, this can either 
be infeasible (see “Connectivity” section) or 
undesirable (e.g., security/privacy concerns), 
making visual inspection a viable alternative. 
In smartphones and watches, visual inspection 
is easy to implement due to available user 
interfaces, however, customized sensing 
devices such as Pi+Tag+Mic often lack 
user interfaces, making the use of LEDs 
imperative to visually monitor liveness of  
data collection. We leveraged this observation 
by shutting down Pi+Tag+Mic devices 
(LEDs go off—easy to notice) in cases of 
critical data collection errors.
Liveness detection can be coupled with 
recovery procedures, increasing reliability of 
data collection. For example, a connectivity 
drop between a SensorTag and Raspberry Pi 
(see “Connectivity” section) terminates the 
process, fetching data from the SensorTag. 
We thus introduced a watchdog process, 
continuously monitoring the data-fetching 
process and restarting it if the process was 
terminated.
In a distributed setup with many devices, 
it makes sense to implement a scheduled 
start-up of data collection. If the data 
collection is interrupted (e.g., Pi+Tag+Mic 
powers off), a manual intervention becomes 
unavoidable. To facilitate a seamless restart 
of data collection, two points need to be 
considered: first, the restart must be fast, 
requiring minimum user interaction such 
as unplugging a device and plugging it 
back in or relaunching the data collection 
app, second, the data collected before the 
interrupt must be saved separately and not 
be overwritten by newly collected data. 
Testing
Testing a data collection platform care-
fully allows identifying many error 
cases and ensuring reliability during the 
real experiment. Here, we outline three 
crucial points for testing derived from our 
experience, providing concrete examples of 
problems encountered and pitfalls to avoid.
First, a data collection platform must 
be tested for realistic deployment time, 
corresponding to the duration of actual 
data collection. This allows identifying, 
memory leaks, durability of power supplies, 
and file size limitations—we empirically 
found a 4 GB WAV size limit imposed by 
the standard, making us adopt the FLAC 
format instead. Second, a data collection 
platform must be thoroughly tested in the 
exact environment it will be deployed in.  
For example, we undertested our platform in 
running cars before collecting data in them, 
resulting in incorrectly chosen microphone 
settings, ruining audio recordings as they
were saturated by the engine hum, and 
necessitating a repeat of the experiment.
Third, a data collection platform 
must be tested with a realistic number 
WE HOPE OUR 
EXPERIENCE 
CAN HELP RAISE 
AWARENESS ABOUT 
THE CHALLENGES 
RESEARCHERS FACE 
WHEN ATTEMPTING 
TO REPRODUCE THE 
WORKS OF OTHERS 
AND COLLECTING 
DATA IN THE WILDFIGURE 2. Example of faulty illuminance values being periodically delivered by SensorTag
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of devices, running under realistic loads. 
Using this principle, we identified a number
of problems related to interference and 
overloaded 2.4 GHz spectrum. For example, 
before opting for Samson Go microphones, 
we tried several more affordable alternatives, 
all of which suffered from interference 
caused by communicating SensorTags, 
making the quality of audio recordings 
unacceptable. In the case of the overloaded 
spectrum, we found that Wi-Fi captures (i.e., 
scanning visible APs) crashed on Raspberry 
Pi and Samsung S6 devices, freezing the 
whole Wi-Fi interface, indicating that there 
might be a serious flaw in the Wi-Fi stack of 
Linux-based devices.
Data Processing
Regarding data processing, we elaborate on 
two main points: first, ensuring the quality 
of collected data, and second, dealing with 
large datasets.
Having collected the data, one must 
ensure its quality, which can be affected by 
devices stopping recording (and manually 
restarted), faulty sensor readings, and 
sampling drift. If the restart of data 
collection is properly implemented, the 
sensor data only needs to be stitched, which 
is straightforward for most modalities 
except audio. If an audio recording is not 
terminated correctly, the resulting audio 
file may become corrupted due to missing 
file headers. We experienced such cases and 
used binary hex editors to manually craft 
audio file headers, completely restoring 
the audio recording; for stitching audio 
recordings we used Audacity.
Sometimes sensors deliver erroneous 
readings, which need to be identified and 
excluded. To do so, we plotted the collected 
sensor data and visually inspected it. This 
turned out to be a very powerful tool to 
spot outliers (see Figure 2) and missing 
data. This type of sanity checks suffices 
for most of the modalities except audio. In 
audio recordings made by heterogeneous 
devices, we observed non-negligible sampling 
drift (see Figure 3) caused by internal 
clock offsets of different devices, despite 
the synchronous start of audio recordings. 
To remedy this, we found the lag between 
heterogeneous audio recordings and applied 
the time-stretching effect in Audacity. 
Similar to prior research [6], we found 
sensor bias among heterogeneous devices, 
most notably in barometric pressure 
readings. We also observed sampling rate 
instability among smartphones of the same 
model, especially for IMU sensors (tested 
with Galaxy S6, Nexus 5X, and 6P), with 
the actual sampling rate deviating by up to 
10% from the set value. The sampling rate 
instability can hinder data collection, for 
example, light sensor readings on Nexus 
5X and 6P missed the advertised sampling 
rate (5 Hz) by a wide margin, going as low 
as 0.2 Hz and, thus, preventing us from 
using these smartphones in our study. The 
sampling rate instability was less prominent 
on smartwatches and insignificant on 
SensorTags. This demonstrates that although 
modern smartphones contain powerful 
sensors, they can be unsuitable for scientific 
measurements [7].
After sanity checking the collected data, 
we ended up with the dataset of 239 GB to 
compute on. To deal with such large data in 
a reasonable time, we followed known best 
practices, which are often overlooked.
First, we ensured sufficient resources 
with access to our institution’s high-
performance cluster. To leverage full 
potential of the cluster, the code running 
on it needs to be customized to work in 
a highly parallel environment. When 
running highly parallel computations, 
one must consider licensing issues if 
commercial software is used. For example, 
to work around shortage of Parallel 
Computing Toolbox licenses in MATLAB, 
we used the MATLAB compiler, allowing 
us to create a standalone application, 
which can be launched royalty-free on an 
arbitrary number of machines. 
Second, we tried avoiding redundant 
operations on large datasets. This can be 
done by using stateful systems such as 
Jupyter Notebook, loading data once and 
keeping it in RAM afterwards. In the case 
of time-consuming computations, we 
recommend liberally caching intermediate 
results to files, which can significantly 
speed up reruns of the evaluation.
Third, we applied compression to reduce 
storage and computing requirements. 
FIGURE 3. Sampling drift between heterogeneous devices: insignificant at the beginning of 
audio recording, it becomes prominent over the course of several hours (highlighted regions 
indicate the same part of audio recording)
21June 2019 | Volume 23, Issue 2   GetMobile
[(ALMOST) UNPUBLISHABLE RESULTS]
REFERENCES
[1] Fomichev, M., Maass, M., Almon, L., Molina, A. 
and Hollick, M. (2019). Perils of zero-interaction 
security in the Internet of Things. Proceedings of 
the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and 
Ubiquitous Technologies, 3(1). DOI:https://doi.
org/10.1145/3314397.
[2] Fomichev, M., Maass, M., Almon, L., Molina, A.  
and Hollick, M. (2019). A dataset for zero-
interaction security systems. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.5281/zenodo.2537721
[3] Benureau, F.C.Y. and Rougier, N.P. (2018, 
January). Re-run, repeat, reproduce, reuse, 
replicate: Transforming code into scientific 
contributions. Frontiers in Neuroinformatics, 
11, 1–8. DOI:https://doi.org/10.3389/
fninf.2017.00069.
[4] Collberg, C. and Proebsting, T.A. (2016, 
February). Repeatability in computer systems 
research. Communications of the ACM, 59(3) 
62–69. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2812803.
[5] Rawassizadeh, R. and Kotz, D. (2017, April). 
Datasets for mobile, wearable and IoT 
research. GetMobile: Mobile Computing and 
Communications, 20(4), 5–7. DOI:https://doi.
org/10.1145/3081016.3081018.
[6] Md Faridee, A.Z., Ramamurthy, S.R. and Roy, N.  
(2018, September). HappyFeet: Challenges in 
building an automated dance recognition and 
assessment tool. GetMobile: Mobile Computing 
and Communications, 22(3), 10–16. DOI:https://
doi.org/10.1145/3308755.3308759
[7] Stisen, A., Blunck, H., Bhattacharya, S.,  
Prentow, T.S., Kjærgaard, M.B., Dey, A., Sonne, T.  
and Jensen, M.M. (2015). Smart Devices are 
Different: Assessing and Mitigating Mobile 
Sensing Heterogeneities for Activity Recognition. 
ACM SenSys., 127–140. DOI:https://doi.
org/10.1145/2809695.2809718
Sensor data is often redundant (e.g., slowly 
changing modalities such as temperature), 
showing great potential for compression. 
We leveraged this observation by counting 
and deduplicating identical instances and 
assigning them weights in the dataset used 
to train the machine learning classifiers, 
reducing its size from 81 GB to 600 MB 
and decreasing training time by orders of 
magnitude. 
Data and Code Release
When releasing a dataset, several issues need
to be considered. First and most importantly,
the data needs to be sufficiently anonymized 
to protect the study subjects and comply 
with legal requirements. If the dataset will 
be released, this should be communicated 
clearly to the study participants as part of the 
informed consent process. We decided to 
keep the audio recordings from two of our 
three scenarios private and only make the 
audio from the third scenario available to 
others upon request. We took precautions 
to limit the privacy impact of this release 
before and during the recording, and 
obtained consent from all involved parties, 
including our IRB. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth 
device identifiers were replaced with 
pseudonyms. The other parts of the dataset 
were deemed to be non-critical, as they did 
not contain any sensitive information.
Once the data has been cleaned and 
anonymized, an appropriate data repository 
needs to be chosen. Prior work discussed 
this issue in more detail [5]. As no fitting 
specialized repository for zero-interaction 
security data exists, we chose the noncom-
mercial general-purpose repository Zenodo. 
To ensure that data can be selectively down-
loaded, we split our dataset into several 
parts (raw data, processed data, and results 
for each of the scenarios). Where our data 
exceeded the size limits of Zenodo, we 
hosted it on Google Drive and created a 
stub dataset on Zenodo, which contained  
a link to the Google Drive folder and a list 
of file hashes to verify the download. We 
also created an index dataset that contains 
links to all individual datasets [2].
To release the code, we created a 
public GitHub repository, chose an Open 
Source license, and linked it to Zenodo 
to obtain a DOI for it. This allows others 
to use our reference implementations of 
the algorithms under test in their own 
research. Using a version control system 
like Git also allowed us to annotate our 
result files with the exact version of the 
code that generated them, as defined by 
the Git commit identifier, and the hashes 
of the input files. Together with a list of the 
exact versions of all libraries, this makes it 
possible for others to exactly reproduce our 
results, as recommended by Benureau and 
Rougier [3].
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed the challenges 
we encountered when reproducing and 
validating five state-of-the-art Zero-
Interaction Security (ZIS) schemes on 
a realistic dataset [1]. They included 
problems in understanding and replicating 
the published schemes due to ambiguous 
descriptions and a lack of published 
source code and datasets, issues with the 
data collection and processing, and the 
subsequent release of the dataset. We also 
discussed a selection of best practices to 
help others overcome these challenges. 
We hope our experience can help raise 
awareness about the challenges researchers 
face when attempting to reproduce the 
works of others and collecting data in the 
wild. We encourage researchers to release 
source code and data [3] to make this 
process easier, allowing others to advance 
the state of knowledge by attempting to 
confirm or invalidate their results. n
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